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Recent work on the mechanisms underlying auditory verbal hallucination (AVH) has been
heavily informed by self-monitoring accounts that postulate defects in an internal monitor-
ing mechanism as the basis of AVH. A more neglected alternative is an account focusing on
defects in auditory processing, namely a spontaneous activation account of auditory activ-
ity underlying AVH. Science is often aided by putting theories in competition. Accordingly,
a discussion that systematically contrasts the two models of AVH can generate sharper
questions that will lead to new avenues of investigation. In this paper, we provide such
a theoretical discussion of the two models, drawing strong contrasts between them. We
identify a set of challenges for the self-monitoring account and argue that the spontaneous
activation account has much in favor of it and should be the default account. Our theoret-
ical overview leads to new questions and issues regarding the explanation of AVH as a
subjective phenomenon and its neural basis. Accordingly, we suggest a set of experimen-
tal strategies to dissect the underlying mechanisms of AVH in light of the two competing
models.
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We shall contrast two proposed mechanisms of auditory verbal
hallucinations (AVH): (a) the family of self-monitoring accounts
and (b) a less discussed spontaneous activity account. On the for-
mer, a monitoring mechanism tracks whether internal episodes
such as inner speech are self- or externally generated while on the
latter, spontaneous auditory activity is the primary basis of AVH.
In one sense, self-monitoring accounts emphasize “top-down”
control mechanisms; spontaneous activity accounts emphasize
“bottom-up” sensory mechanisms. The aim of this paper is not to
provide a comprehensive literature review on AVH as there have
been recent reviews (1, 2). Rather, we believe that it remains an
open question what mechanisms underlie AVH in schizophrenia,
and that by drawing clear contrasts between alternative models, we
can identify experimental directions to explain what causes AVH.
Self-monitoring accounts have provided much impetus to current
theorizing about AVH, but one salient aspect of our discussion is
to raise questions as to whether such accounts, as currently formu-
lated, can adequately explain AVH. We believe that there are in fact
significant limitations to the account that have largely gone unno-
ticed. Still, both models we consider might hold, and this requires
further empirical investigation. Conceptual and logical analysis,
however, will play an important role in aiding empirical work.
LOGICAL AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES REGARDING
MECHANISMS OF AVH
What is AVH? It is important to be rigorous in identifying what
we are trying to explain, especially since clinical diagnosis of
schizophrenia depends on patients’ reports of the phenomenology
of their experience. Yet even among non-clinical populations, the
concepts we use to categorize experiences may be quite fuzzy and
imprecise (3). While there is little controversy that AVH involves
language (emphasis on “verbal”) we restrict our attention to audi-
tory experiences, namely where AVH is phenomenally like hearing
a voice. Just as cognitive scientists distinguish between perception
and thought in normal experience, we should where possible dis-
tinguish between auditory hallucination and thought phenomena
(e.g., thought insertion). Admittedly, categorizing a patient’s expe-
rience as auditory or thought can be difficult, but we should first
aim to explain the clear cases, those with clear auditory phenome-
nology. Finally, by “hallucination” we take a simple view: in AVH,
these involve internal (auditory) representations that a verbalized
sound occurs when there is no such sound.
One of the prevailing standard models of AVH invokes self- (or
source-) monitoring (see Figure 1). This covers a family of models
that share a core idea: a defect in a system whose role is to monitor
internal episodes as self-generated. There is good evidence that
patients with schizophrenia show defective self-monitoring on a
variety of measures (4), and this may explain some positive symp-
toms such as delusions of control. It remains an open question,
however, whether this defect is the causal basis of AVH.
We begin with proposals for the mental substrate of AVH: inner
speech, auditory imagery, or auditory memory (5, 6). Most mod-
els take inner speech to be the substrate, but we think there are
compelling phenomenological reasons against this (7, 8). Inner
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FIGURE 1 | Depiction of the two causal mechanisms for the generation of auditory verbal hallucination (AVH). The self-monitoring model is more
complex than the spontaneous activity account.
speech is generally in one’s own voice, is in the first-person point
of view (“I”), and often lacks acoustical phenomenology (9). But
even if there is controversy whether inner speech is auditory, there
is no such controversy regarding AVH. As clinicians are aware,
patients reflecting on the phenomenology of AVH typically report
strong acoustical properties that are typically characteristic of
hearing another person’s voice, where the voice typically speaks
from a second- or third-personal point of view (“you” or “them”
as opposed to “I”). Thus, what is typically represented in AVH
experiences is starkly different from what is represented in normal
inner speech experiences.
This point on phenomenological grounds indicates that a self-
monitoring model that identifies inner speech as the substrate
for AVH incurs an additional explanatory burden. It must pro-
vide a further mechanism that transforms the experience of the
subject’s own inner voice, in the first-person and often lacking
acoustical properties such as pitch, timbre, and intensity into
the experience of someone else’s voice, in the second- or third-
person, with acoustical properties. For example, how does inner
speech in one’s own voice with its characteristic features become
an AVH of, for example, the neighbor’s voice with its character-
istic features? To point out that a patient mistakenly attributes
the source of his own inner speech to the neighbor does not
explain the phenomenological transformation. Indeed, once we
allow that a given episode of AVH involves the features of another
person’s voice with its characteristic acoustic features, it is sim-
ple to explain why the patient misattributes the event to another
person: that is what it sounds like. Indeed, a phenomenological
study found that in addition to being quite adept at differen-
tiating AVH from everyday thoughts, patients found that the
identification of the voices as another person’s voice was a crit-
ical perceptual feature that helped in differentiating the voices
from thought (10). The point then is that inner speech mod-
els of AVH are more complex, requiring an additional mecha-
nism to explain the distinct phenomenology of AVH vs. inner
speech.
On grounds of simplicity, we suggest that self-monitoring
accounts should endorse auditory imagination of another per-
son’s voice as the substrate of AVH. If they do this, they obviate
a need for the additional transformation step since the imagery
substrate will already have the requisite phenomenal properties.
Auditory imagination is characterized by acoustical phenomenol-
ogy that is in many respects like hearing a voice: it represents
another’s voice with its characteristic acoustical properties. Thus,
our patient may auditorily imagine the neighbor’s voice saying
certain negative things, and this leads to a hallucination when
the subject loses track of this episode as self-generated. On this
model, there is then no need for a mechanism that transforms
inner speech phenomenology to AVH phenomenology. Only the
failure of self-monitoring is required, a simpler mechanism. In
this case, failure of self-monitoring might be causally sufficient
for AVH. We shall take these imagination-based self-monitoring
models as our stalking horse.
But what is the proposed “self-tagging” mechanism? We think
self-monitoring theorists need more concrete mechanistic pro-
posals here. The most detailed answer invokes corollary discharge,
mostly in the context of forward models (11–13). This answer
has the advantage that it goes beyond metaphors, and we have
made much progress in understanding the neurobiology of the
corollary discharge signal and forward modeling [see Ref. (14) for
review]. These ideas have an ancestor in von Helmholtz’s explana-
tion of position constancy in vision in the face of eye movements:
why objects appear to remain stable in position even though our
eyes are constantly moving. Position constancy is sometimes char-
acterized as the visual system’s distinguishing between self- and
other-induced retinal changes, and this is suggestive toward what
goes wrong in AVH.
Forward models, and more generally predictive models, build
on a corollary discharge signal and have been widely used in the
motor control literature [see Ref. (15) for review; for relevant cir-
cuitry in primates controlling eye movement, see Ref. (16)]. The
basic model has also been extended to schizophrenia (11–13), and
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a crucial idea is that the forward model makes a sensory prediction
that can then suppress or cancel the sensory reafference. When the
prediction is accurate, then sensory reafference is suppressed or
canceled, and the system can be said to recognize that the episode
was internally rather than externally generated.
There are, in fact, many details that must be filled in for this
motor control model to explain AVH, but that is a job for the
self-monitoring theorist. Rather, we think that failure of self-
monitoring, understood via forward models, is still not sufficient
for AVH, even with auditory imagination as the substrate. The
reason is that there is nothing in the cancelation or suppression of
reafference – essentially an error signal – that on its own says any-
thing about whether the sensory input is self- or other-generated.
Put simply: a zero error signal is not the same as a signal indicating
self-generation, nor is a positive error signal the same as a signal
indicating other-generation. After all, the computation of predic-
tion error is used in other systems that have nothing to do with
AVH, say movement control. Thus, while an error signal can be
part of the basis of AVH, it is not on its own sufficient for it. Given
the failure of sufficiency of self-monitoring models on their own
to explain AVH, we believe that an additional mechanism beyond
failure of self-monitoring will always be required to explain AVH.
Specifically, the required mechanism, an interpreter, is one that
explains the difference between self and other. The challenge for
proponents of the account is to specify the nature of this addi-
tional mechanism [e.g., (17)]. As Figure 1 shows, the mechanism
for AVH on self-monitoring accounts is quite complex.
We now turn to an alternative that provides a simple causally
sufficient condition for AVH: AVH arise from spontaneous activ-
ity in auditory and related memory areas. We shall refer to this
account as the spontaneous activity account [for similar propos-
als, see Ref. (2, 18, 19)]. The relevant substrates are the activation
of specific auditory representation of voices, whether in imagina-
tion or memory recall (for ease of expression in what follows, we
shall speak of activity in auditory areas to cover both sensory and
relevant auditory memory regions, specifically the activation of
representations of the voice that the subject typically experiences
in AVH). We think that this should be the default account of AVH
for the following reason: we know that appropriate stimulation
of auditory and/or relevant memory areas is sufficient for AVH.
Wilder Penfield provided such a proof of concept experiment.
Penfield and Perot (20) showed dramatically that stimulation
along the temporal lobe resulted in quite complex auditory hallu-
cinations. For instance, stimulations along the superior temporal
gyrus elicited AVH with phenomenology typical of schizophrenia
AVH, as noted in his case reports: “They sounded like a bunch of
women talking together.” (622 p.); or more indistinct AVH – “Just
like someone whispering, or something, in my left ear” or “a man’s
voice, I could not understand what he said” (640 p.). Activity in
these areas, spontaneously or induced, in the absence of an actual
auditory input are cases of auditory hallucination: auditory expe-
rience of external sounds that do not in fact exist. The clinical
entity epilepsy provides a similar, more naturalistic example of
spontaneous cortical activity giving rise to AVH, in addition to a
wide variety of other positive symptoms (21). The hypothesis of
spontaneous activity is that AVH in schizophrenia derives from
spontaneous auditory activation of auditory representations.
The basic idea of the spontaneous activity account is that the
auditory system, broadly construed, encodes representations of
previously heard voices and their acoustical properties. In the case
of normal audition, some of these representations are also acti-
vated by actual voices in the environment, leading ultimately to
auditory experiences that represent those voices. The idea of hal-
lucination then is that these representations can be spontaneously
activated in the absence of environmental sounds. Thus, the ini-
tiation of an episode of AVH is driven by spontaneous activation.
Certainly, as in many cases of AVH, the experience can be tempo-
rally extended. This might result from some top-down influences
such as the subject’s attention to the voice, which can further acti-
vate the relevant regions, leading to an extended hallucination.
Indeed, there are reported cases of patients answering the AVH
with inner speech in a dialog [12 of 29 patients in Ref. (9)]. Further,
that top-down processes are abnormally engaged by bottom-up
influences is suggested by the finding that there is a disturbance in
connectivity from the superior temporal gyrus (sensory region) to
the anterior cingulate cortex (involved in cognitive control) with
AVH compared to patients without AVH and healthy controls (22).
This raises two points: (1) that an inner speech response could
induce additional activation of auditory representations and (2)
that self-monitoring models that take inner speech as the AVH
substrate are quite implausible here since the monitoring mecha-
nism must go on and off precisely with the AVH and inner speech
exchange.
Since the auditory representations spontaneously activated
already encode a distinct person’s voice and its acoustical proper-
ties, there is no need for a system to interpret the voice represented
as belonging to another person (recall the issue regarding inner
speech above). That information about “otherness” is already
encoded in the representation of another’s voice. In this way, the
spontaneous activity account bypasses the complex machinery
invoked in self-monitoring. On its face, then, the spontaneous
activity account identifies a plausible sufficient causal condition
for AVH that is much simpler than self-monitoring mechanisms.
There are, of course, details to be filled in, but our point is to con-
trast two possible mechanisms: self-monitoring and spontaneous
activity. We hope, at least, to have provided some initial reasons
why the latter might be more compelling.
When a field is faced with two contrasting models, it must
undertake specific experiments to see which may hold. Before we
delve into concrete experimental proposals, we want to highlight
some remaining conceptual points. First, the models are not con-
tradictory, and thus both could be true. We might discover that
across patients with AVH or across AVH episodes within a sin-
gle patient, AVH divides between the two mechanisms. Second,
both models make some similar predictions, namely that in AVH,
we should see the absence of appropriate self-monitoring in an
AVH episode, though for different reasons. On the self-monitoring
account, this absence is due to a defect in the self-monitoring
system; on the spontaneous activity account, this absence is due
to spontaneous activity that bypasses self-monitoring. Critically,
empirical evidence that demonstrates absence of appropriate self-
monitoring during AVH does not support the self-monitoring
account as against the spontaneous activity account. We need
different experiments.
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Finally, the spontaneous activity account is more parsimonious
as seen in Figure 1, but is this really an advantage? Note that all
accounts of AVH must explain (a) the spontaneity of AVH episodes
(they often just happen) and (b) the specificity of phenomenol-
ogy in AVH, namely negative content, second or third-person
perspective, and a specific voice, identity and gender, etc. Both
accounts can deal with the spontaneity: in self-monitoring, it is
explained by spontaneous failure of self-monitoring so that AVH
feels spontaneous; in the spontaneous activity account, it is the
actual spontaneous activity of auditory areas.
A major challenge to all theories of AVH is to explain its
specificity: why is it often a specific voice, negative in content,
and focused on specific themes? Still, self-monitoring accounts
face an additional challenge given that self-monitoring is a gen-
eral mechanism applied to all internal episodes: why aren’t more
internal auditory episodes experienced as “other.” For if a gen-
eral self-monitoring mechanism for auditory processing fails, one
would expect many more kinds of AVH: of their own voice as in
playback, of environmental sounds, music, and so on [auditory
non-verbal hallucinations are reported, but much less than voices;
(23)]. Self-monitoring accounts could postulate a highly specific
failure of self-monitoring, but note that this is no better than
spontaneous activity theorists postulating spontaneous activation
of specific representations. So, either self-monitoring mechanisms,
being general, make predictions inconsistent with the facts or they
are no better off on the specificity of AVH than the alternative
spontaneous activation account.
POTENTIAL EXPERIMENTAL DIRECTIONS
In the previous section, we provided conceptual and logical
grounds distinguishing two mechanisms of AVH and why we
might prefer the spontaneous activity account. Still, the issues are
fundamentally empirical. There are two plausible, starkly differ-
ent mechanisms to explain AVH. What experiments might tease
them apart? Studies in schizophrenia have characterized the neural
correlates of the AVH-prone trait or actual AVH events, yielding
important information about the potential functional and neu-
roanatomic basis for AVH, for instance, identifying areas involved
in speech generation and perception [e.g., (24–26); also see meta-
analyses by Jadri et al. (2); Modinos et al. (27); Palaniyappan et al.
(28)], including evidence of competition for neurophysiologic
resources that subserve normal processing of external speech (29).
However, the studies have largely been correlative. For instance, the
activity of Broca’s area as reported by McGuire et al. (24) could be
interpreted as either due to sub-vocalizations that give rise to AVH
per se but could also reflect responses to the AVH as commonly
occurs. As such, prior work has largely lacked the experimental
interventions that could establish causality and help to adjudicate
between varying accounts. We outline potential interventions and
their potential utility in deciding between the self-monitoring and
spontaneous activity accounts.
The two accounts outlined above propose either lack of func-
tioning (self-monitoring account) or inappropriate activation
(spontaneous activation account) of neural/cognitive processes.
Accordingly, potential experimental interventions could include
perturbing self-monitoring processes vs. stimulation of sensory
areas in healthy individuals to approximate the AVH experience
Table 1 | Auditory verbal hallucination mechanisms: proof of concept
studies.
Intervention Possible outcomes Commentary
Disrupt self-monitoring
during inner speech
AVH of one’s own
inner voice (does not
reproduce typical
schizophrenia AVH)
To date, there have been
no reports in the
literature of such
experiments for
self-monitoring
Disrupt self-monitoring
during auditory imagery
AVH of imagined
voices
As above
Stimulate auditory
cortices
AVH with typical
phenomenology
There are relevant cases
for stimulation of
auditory cortices, e.g.,
neurosurgical studies
(20); “naturalistic
studies” [epilepsy; (21)]
reported by patients. One could also implement the same inter-
ventions in patients – perhaps to greater effect, as they could most
authoritatively provide first-hand verification of whether such
interventions reproduce AVH phenomenology. Finally, in patients
who experience AVH as part of their illness, therapeutic interven-
tions could remediate putative disturbances and could result in
resolution of AVH symptoms; if such interventions could specif-
ically target the processes under consideration, such an approach
could provide strong support for a causal account of AVH (see
Table 1).
TESTING SELF-MONITORING ACCOUNTS
Would perturbing self-monitoring processes provide evidence that
it is the basis of AVH in schizophrenia? This is not clear. For
example, a straightforward prediction of certain self-monitoring
accounts that identify inner speech as the relevant substrate would
be that perturbing self-monitoring processes in healthy individu-
als would be causally sufficient for the experience of hearing one’s
own voice but with attribution to an external source. Concretely
interpreted, it would be akin to listening to a playback of one’s
recorded voice. This result, however, would only show that such
perturbation yields a distinct form of AVH, namely hallucina-
tion of one’s voice as in a playback [though “replay” of patients’
thoughts or speech did not emerge as a significant contributor
to the cluster analytic descriptions of the phenomenology; (19)].
Given the phenomenological differences from typical AVH, addi-
tional mechanisms are required to explain the full array of AVH
characteristics, as noted in our “neighbor” example above.
A more plausible substrate for AVH is auditory imagination of
another’s voice, so in principle, perturbation of self-monitoring
during such imagination might yield AVH phenomenologically
similar to that in schizophrenia. This seems a plausible test of self-
monitoring accounts, though its implementation would require
more concrete localization of the relevant self-monitoring mech-
anisms [Jadri et al. (2) noted midline cortical structures typically
implicated in self-monitoring paradigms did not emerge as sig-
nificant in their meta-analyses of imaging studies of AVH]. The
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relevant experiments are yet to be done, but the claim that fail-
ure of self-monitoring is sufficient for AVH raises the question,
noted above: why don’t patients exhibit a wider range of AVH
phenomenology?
What of interventions in patient populations vis-a-vis self-
monitoring mechanisms? Employing a similar approach in
schizophrenia patients would lead to similar predictions as
in non-clinical populations, subject to the same logical con-
straints. Accordingly, upon experimentally interfering with self-
monitoring during inner speech, a patient may report that they
now have the experience of AVH of their own voice that is
notably novel and distinct from their already existing AVH. Alter-
natively, with intervention during auditory imagination, they may
report that their AVH has simply worsened in intensity/frequency,
retaining similar phenomenology.
Nevertheless, there will always remain a logical gap between
these inductions of AVH in both healthy and patient populations:
the mechanisms of AVH could still be driven by spontaneous acti-
vation even though these interventions show that disruption of
self-monitoring suffice for a form of AVH. Thus, what is required
is to manipulate the putative mechanism during episodes of AVH
in patients. This is not to say, however, that the previous experi-
ments are useless. Far from it. Minimally, we can treat them as proof
of concept experiments. They can demonstrate that such mecha-
nisms can do the purported work, namely the induction of AVH.
It is worth emphasizing a difference between the two mechanisms:
while the spontaneous activation account already has a proof of
concept result (e.g., Penfield’s work), no such proof has yet been
done for self-monitoring in respect of AVH.
How then to directly manipulate the purported mechanism?
Since the self-monitoring approach postulates a loss of func-
tion, an obvious manipulation is to see if AVH is ameliorated
by restoration of this function. Cognitive behavioral therapies tai-
lored to psychosis treatment have been successful at improving
symptoms but the targets of therapy (e.g., distress from psychosis,
depression) as well as the benefits (e.g., positive and negative
symptoms) have been non-specific (30). While such approaches
have clear clinical value, a more ideal approach for elucidating
AVH mechanisms would entail interventions that are tailored
to specifically target source monitoring processes. A case report
of such an approach reported on a patient whose most promi-
nent clinical symptom was daily thought insertion experiences
and whose training involved improving their ability to accurately
recall the source of self- vs. experimenter-generated items (31).
Interestingly, the thought insertion symptoms did not improve
as would be hypothesized, but an auditory hallucinations sub-
scale showed improvement with training. So, while this finding
is limited by interpretive issues, sample size, and a task that only
indirectly taps self-monitoring processes (i.e., involving recall of
sources rather than a more on-line measure), larger studies with
refined task paradigms could yield a more definitive test of mon-
itoring accounts of AVH. Conversely, given a means to safely
perturb self-monitoring, following the logic for healthy individ-
uals, one could similarly (further) impair this process in patients
with similar considerations of the array of possible phenomeno-
logical outcomes. These experimental proposals are summarized
in Table 2.
Table 2 | Auditory verbal hallucination mechanisms: testing
self-monitoring account in schizophrenia.
Intervention Possible outcomes Commentary
Disrupt self-
monitoring
Worsening of
existing AVH
As self-monitoring posits loss of
function, it is unclear that disruption
of self-monitoring during discrete
AVH episodes provides relevant
outcomes
Increase in types of
experienced AVH
(e.g., inner speech)
Further disruption of self-monitoring
should lead to increase in AVH, but
with predicted expansion of the
type of AVH experienced (e.g., inner
speech)
Remediation
of monitoring
deficits
Decrease in
frequency of AVH
An ideal intervention of targeted
remediation of self-monitoring
during discrete AVH episodes in
patients is currently unavailable
General remediation studies have
shown positive effects in AVH, but
more studies are needed
TESTING SPONTANEOUS ACTIVITY ACCOUNTS
We have argued that a more parsimonious account of AVH
involves susceptibility of relevant brain regions for spontaneous
activation without external stimulation or volitional impetus.
Such a mechanism could account for the full phenomenology
of AVH, assuming that brain areas that represent the complex
content and form of AVH show spontaneous activations of the
sort found in normal auditory experience. Also consistent with
the idea of spontaneous activation in sensory areas are find-
ings from studies of auditory cortical responses in schizophre-
nia. The ability of cortical networks to coordinate their activity
through gamma (30–80 Hz) oscillations is thought to be crit-
ical for the binding of perceptual features in creating coher-
ent object representations (32). In studies of auditory process-
ing, individuals with schizophrenia show reduced gamma syn-
chrony compared with healthy controls (33–37). Interestingly,
however, patients show correlations between auditory halluci-
nation severity and gamma synchrony (38), consistent with the
idea that a preserved excitability of sensory cortical areas is nec-
essary for inappropriate spontaneous activations giving rise to
AVH.
On this account, instabilities in sensory cortical areas would
lead to spontaneous activations, but only do so in a coordi-
nated fashion in those individuals with preserved ability to sustain
gamma synchrony, thus giving rise to AVH. There would be an
absence of AVH both in patients with reduced capacity for sus-
taining gamma synchrony as well as healthy individuals, due,
respectively, to the inability to sustain such coordinated activity
necessary for the perception of AVH or the lack of such insta-
bilities that would inappropriately activate the cortex. Notably,
such spontaneous activations could bypass any monitoring process
since there is no inner speech or other self-initiated processes to
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issue a corollary discharge that would engage such monitoring,
impaired, or otherwise.
The most definitive experiments to distinguish between the two
models involve interventions in the activity of relevant auditory
areas. The logic is as follows: the spontaneous activation account
holds that the basis of AVH in patients with schizophrenia is the
aberrant activation of relevant sensory areas. Accordingly, if it
were possible to suppress such activation “on-line” while patients
were experiencing AVH and show that such suppression, say by
TMS, attenuated the hallucinatory experience, this would be good
evidence that such activity was causally necessary for AVH in
schizophrenia. An intervention to test causal sufficiency would
be to then stimulate the areas identified as necessary to see if AVH
of the same kind could be generated. Positive results along both
dimensions would be strong support for the spontaneous activity
account.
This proposal has been indirectly tested by Hoffman and other
groups making similar use of TMS as a treatment for auditory
hallucinations (39, 40). In contrast to the event-related design
described above, the focus by Hoffman and others has been on
clinical efficacy rather than elucidating of mechanisms. Accord-
ingly, TMS interventions have been applied according to protocols
whose timing is determined irrespective of their precise relation-
ship to the specific episodes of AVH. While results are varied,
meta-analyses confirm the utility of such a therapeutic approach
(41, 42). So, while an “on-line” cortical suppression-mediated
reduction in AVH would be more compelling, the general efficacy
of such an approach is consistent with a local cortical spontaneous
activation account.
One complication with the previous experiment arises if self-
monitoring accounts require the activity of relevant sensory areas in
self-monitoring computations. Thus, intervention in sensory areas
might also affect the processes the self-monitoring account invokes
to explain AVH. To make progress here, self-monitoring theorists
must explain what computational role the sensory areas might
play. There seem to us two possibilities. First, the sensory areas
might compute the signal that is then compared against the corol-
lary discharge signal so as to compute prediction error, as in
forward modeling. If so, the experiment we have just proposed
would help to adjudicate between the two models. On the sponta-
neous activity account, suppression of activation in sensory areas
would suppress AVH. The opposite result would be seen in the
proposed self-monitoring account. Self signals are associated with
zero or low error when the corollary discharge is compared with
the reafference signal, so when sensory areas are suppressed by
TMS, the prediction is that computed error will be larger yielding
an “other” signal. Thus, AVH should be exacerbated when activity
in sensory areas is suppressed.
A second possibility is more congenial with self-monitoring
accounts that invoke auditory imagery, since the imagery requires
activation of relevant sensory areas (5, 43). On this view, the
areas in question precisely are the substrate of the experience;
what is critical is that the subject loses track of the fact that
they are actively imagining. Consequently, AVH results. This
version of self-monitoring would then agree with spontaneous
activity accounts in predicting that suppression of activity in
auditory areas during AVH yields reduced AVH. The difference
Table 3 | Auditory verbal hallucination mechanisms: testing
spontaneous activity account in schizophrenia.
Intervention
Possible
outcomes
Commentary
Inhibition of sensory
cortex during discrete
AVH episodes
AVH decrease Demonstrates that a modulation
of auditory cortical activity
correspondingly modulates AVH
severity
During quiescent
non-AVH period,
stimulation of same
cortical region shown
to be sensitive for
inhibition of AVH
AVH with
complete
phenomenology
As above
Generalized inhibition
of sensory cortex
Decrease in
AVH frequency
Hoffman et al. (39, 40) have
implemented generalized
inhibition, demonstrating overall
decrease in frequency of AVH
A stronger test would be cortical
inhibition during discrete AVH
episodes as above
between the models, then, is that the self-monitoring account
takes sensory activation to be driven top-down. Accordingly, there
is an additional way to disrupt AVH according to this version
of self-monitoring: disrupting the top-down signal driving sen-
sory activation. The spontaneous activity account holds that as
there is no need for such top-down signals as the only way
to manipulate AVH is via manipulation of the sensory area.
To experimentally separate these models, we again need con-
crete mechanistic proposals from the self-monitoring account so
that possible experimental manipulations can be designed (see
Table 3).
CONCLUSION
There is much experimental work yet to be done on specific mech-
anisms for AVH. While we favor one model, our goal has been to
clarify the conceptual landscape in the hopes of prompting more
directed experiments to determine which is operative [though,
as we noted, both or perhaps an integration of bottom-up and
top-down accounts (44, 45) could be operative, yielding multi-
ple mechanisms for AVH]. Having competing accounts on the
field should aid focused inquiry on testing concrete mechanis-
tic proposals. In doing this, we believe that we can make more
progress toward understanding what causes AVH in patients with
schizophrenia.
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